An agent for ecological deliberation by Debenham, John & Sierra, Carles
An Agent for Ecological Deliberation
John Debenham1 and Carles Sierra2
1 University of Technology, Sydney, Australia
debenham@it.uts.edu.au
2 Institut d’Investigacio´ en Intel·lige`ncia Artificial - IIIA,
Spanish Scientific Research Council, CSIC
08193 Bellaterra, Catalonia, Spain
sierra@iiia.csic.es
Abstract. An agent architecture supports the two forms of deliberation used by
human agents. Cartesian, constructivist rationalism leads to game theory, decision
theory and logical models. Ecological rationalism leads to deliberative actions
that are derived from agents’ prior interactions and are not designed; i.e., they are
strictly emergent. This paper aims to address the scant attention paid by the agent
community to the predominant form of deliberation used by mankind.
1 Introduction
This paper describes a form of agency that enables rational agents to move beyond
Cartesian rationalism. The work is founded on the two forms of rationality described by
the two Nobel Laureates Friedrich Hayek [1] and Vernon Smith [2] as being within ‘two
worlds’. Hayek and Smith identify; constructivist rationality that underpins rational
predictive models of decision making; and, ecological rationality that refers to social
institutions and practices that emerge from the history of an agent’s interactions and are
not pre-designed.
For intelligent agency we interpret Hayek and Smith’s two rationalities as:
– Constructivist. An agent’s actions are determined by a theory that may be inde-
pendent of the particular environment in which the agent is situated, and typically
requires access to data.
– Ecological. An agent’s actions are the product of prior agents’ actions only — delib-
eration that uses past experience and contextual triggers to build action sequences
from experiential memory.
This paper is concerned with the issue generally known as bounded rationality that
dates back to David Hume [3] and more recently to the early work of Herbert Simon.
Bounded rationality refers to systems that are not founded on Cartesian rationalism;
it has been widely addressed in economics [4], and is discussed in all good books on
artificial intelligence, e.g. [5].
For over fifty years artificial intelligence research has spawned countless theories and
systems that are not founded on Cartesian rationalism; one classic contribution being
Rodney Brooks’ work reported in his ‘Computers and Thought’ award-winning paper
[6]. Despite these advances, work in multiagent systems has been heavily influenced by
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game theory, decision theory and logic [7]; this is in contrast to an original motivation
for investigating ‘distributed artificial intelligence’ in the mid 1970s where intelligence
emerged from the interactions between systems.
Why would an agent be motivated to deliberate in a non-constructivist way? First,
it may not be aware of a constructivist theory that addresses its goals. Second, it may
have difficulty articulating its needs and its context completely and accurately in the
theory. Third, the data required by the theory to determine its actions may not be read-
ily available. Fourth, it may not have sufficient time for all this to happen. Fifth, it may
favour ecological deliberation simply because it leads to a superior outcome. For exam-
ple, when selecting a bottle of wine, some human agents refer to books of ratings and
prices and make a constructivist choice, whereas others rely on their merchant to make
a choice for them — this choice is purely ecological, its ‘rationality’ is in the trust that
has been built through repeated interaction.
The main contribution of this paper is to describe a single agent that exhibits ecolog-
ical deliberation, we show how it evolves as its experience grows. Various preliminaries
are described in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the essential features of the agent archi-
tecture including the world model, and a ‘social model’ that is essential to ecological
deliberation. Section 4 describes expectations of the effect of actions in the experien-
tial memory— these expectations include measures of trust. Section 5 describes the
ecological deliberative process, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
A multiagent system {α,β1, . . . ,βo, ξ, θ1, . . . , θt}, contains an agent α that interacts
with negotiating agents, βi, and information providing agents, θj . We assume that each
dialogical interaction takes place within a particular institution that is represented by an
institutional agent, ξ, [8]. Institutions, or normative systems, play a central role in this
work. We will describe an ontology that will permit us both to structure the dialogues
and to structure the processing of the information gathered by agents. Our agent α
has two languages: C is an illocutionary-based language for communication, and L is a
probabilistic first-order language for internal representation including the representation
of its world model Mt. C is described in [9].
An agent’s in-coming messages and observations of the effect of its own actions are
tagged with the identity of the sending agent and the time received, and are stored in
a repository. A world model contains beliefs of the state of the other agents and the
environment, and a social model contains beliefs of the state of the agent’s relation-
ships with the other agents. The agent’s experiential memory contains complete historic
information concerning prior actions and sequences of actions — this is detailed in
Section 3.
Some messages trigger the agent’s reactive logic that overrides other activities. The
agent aims to satisfy its needs using one of two forms of deliberation: constructivist
(described in [10]) that is based on theories that call on plans, and ecological that uses
past experience and contextual triggers to retrieve or build action sequences from expe-
riential memory.
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An ecologically rational agent α with need ν in context Θt will act using the lottery
Eα(Htα, ν,Θt) ∈ ∆(M× B) where:
Eα : H ×N × I → ∆(M× B) (1)
where Eα is a function that is not founded on an abstraction or theory that models,
explains, constrains, describes or prescribes the behaviour of agents or the environment;
it encapsulates α’s particular ecological rationality. As above, if α has an open dialogue
then Equation 1 determines (non-deterministically) the next utterance that α makes in
that dialogue. Ecologically rational agents are non-deterministic. The action performed
by a deterministic ecologically rational agent is determined by: Eα : H × N × I →
M× B.
The “ecological rationality” in Eα is based on the belief that the wisdom in Htα can
somehow tell α how to act rationally. This belief is not an abstraction or “theory” (as
described above); it is simply a belief that the wisdom embedded in prior observations
are a basis for rational action. In a simple form, this belief may be that prior agent
behaviour reliably indicates future behaviour1. That is, ecological rationality may be
founded on a sense of trust that α has in agents, i.e. that they will continue to behave
with no less integrity than that which they have displayed in the past. Ecological ra-
tionality may also be founded on the reputation that another agent has, or on trust in
the institution (i.e. a normative multiagent system to which all the agents belong) to
ensure that agents behave in some way [11]. In addition, Ecological rationality may be
founded on subtle observations mined fromHtα. As a simple example, “Whenever John
is running a marketing promotion Carles invariable gives excellent service”. In general,
ecologically rational behaviour will be derived from Htα using data mining techniques.
Ecological rationality, like trust, is an experience-based phenomenon — it can not exist
without experience. At the “top end”, ecological rationality embodies all the models
that have been described from information-based agents including the important notion
of integrity2.
3 Agent Architecture
α acts to satisfy a need. Needs either trigger α’s constructivist, goal/plan deliberative
reasoning described in [10], or ecological deliberation described in Section 5.
α’s experiential memory contains a history of what happened when any goal-directed
sequence of actions was triggered or when any individual action was observed. First an
individual action experience, a, consists of: (i) the action, aact, i.e. the utterance, the
sending and receiving agents, and the time at which the action was taken, (ii) the trigger,
or precondition, that signalled when the action was to be performed, atrig, and (iii) any
observed effect(s), aeffect, i.e. any identifiable responses that are an effect of aact — see
Section 4.
1 Such a belief may incorporate context. For example, “John is most reliable except on Mon-
days”.
2 The extent to which a partner agent will take advantage of his private information when enact-
ing his commitments. E.g. “I haven’t got the strawberries you ordered because they were all
rain damaged.”
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Then a sequence experience, s, consists of: (i) the goal of the sequence, sgoal, that
may have been to satisfy a need, (ii) a sequence of action experiences, sa = (ai)ni=1,
where each action experience ai is described as above, (iii) beliefs of the prevailing en-
vironment, senv, that includes: the institutional norms that apply at the time, snorm, the
agents involved in the interaction, sagents, and the state of the social model (see Sec-
tion 3.2) between the agents, ssocial, i.e. senv = {snorm, sagents, ssocial}, (iv) a rating
of the outcome of the action sequence, srate, that enables an ecologically rational agent
to develop its repertoire of actions.
This rating is not simply in terms of the extent to which the sequence outcome met
the original need, but in a sense that includes the possibility that the other agents in-
volved may have adapted their actions to take account of changes in circumstance that
occur during the sequence itself, or even that they went “over the odds” and gave more
than was expected of them in some sense. These ratings are on a fuzzy scale from−5 to
+5 where 0 means “is perfectly acceptable”,−5 means “ghastly, completely unaccept-
able” and +5 means “better than I could have dreamed of”. Ratings are not a ‘utility
function’ in any sense — they are a subjective assessment of outcomes that is totally
dependent on the prevailing state of the environment.
α uses the contents of its experiential memory to: reuse successful action sequences,
build new sequences from individual actions, and improve prior sequences by using its
knowledge of individual action experiences.
The integrity of beliefs derived from observations decreases in time. α may have
background knowledge concerning the expected integrity of a belief as t → ∞. Such
background knowledge is represented as a decay limit distribution. If the background
knowledge is incomplete then one possibility is for α to assume that the decay limit dis-
tribution has maximum entropy whilst being consistent with the data. Given an uncer-
tain belief represented as the distribution, P(Xi), and a decay limit distribution D(Xi),
P(Xi) decays by:
Pt+1(Xi) = ∆i(D(Xi),Pt(Xi)) (2)
where∆i is the decay function for theXi satisfying the property that limt→∞ Pt(Xi) =
D(Xi). For example,∆i could be linear: Pt+1(Xi) = (1− νi)×D(Xi)+ νi×Pt(Xi),
where νi < 1 is the decay rate for the i’th distribution. Either the decay function or the
decay limit distribution could also be a function of time: ∆ti and Dt(Xi).
3.1 World Model
In the absence of in-coming messages the integrity of Mt decays by Equation 2. The
following procedure updates Mt for all utterances expressed in C. Suppose that α
receives a message µ from agent β at time t. Suppose that this message states that
something is so with probability z, and suppose that α attaches an epistemic belief
Rt(α,β, µ) to µ — this probability reflects α’s level of personal caution. Each of α’s
active plans, s, contains constructors for a set of distributions {Xi} ∈ Mt together
with associated update functions, Js(·), such that JXis (µ) is a set of linear constraints
on the posterior distribution for Xi. Examples of these update functions are given in
[12]. Denote the prior distribution Pt(Xi) by p, and let p(µ) be the distribution with
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minimum relative entropy3 with respect to p: p(µ) = argminr
∑
j rj log
rj
pj
that satis-
fies the constraints JXis (µ). Then let q(µ) be the distribution:
q(µ) = Rt(α,β, µ) × p(µ) + (1− Rt(α,β, µ)) × p (3)
and then let:
Pt(Xi(µ)) =
{
q(µ) q(µ) is more interesting than p
p otherwise
(4)
A general measure of whether q(µ) is ‘more interesting than’ p is: K(q(µ)‖D(Xi)) >
K(p‖D(Xi)), where K(x‖y) =∑j xj ln xjyj is the Kullback-Leibler distance between
two probability distributions x and y.
Finally merging Equations 4 and 2 we obtain the method for updating a distribution
Xi on receipt of a message µ:
Pt+1(Xi) = ∆i(D(Xi),Pt(Xi(µ))) (5)
This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two probabilities: first, any proba-
bility z in the message µ, and second the belief Rt(α,β, µ) that α attached to µ.
Rt(α,β, µ) is estimated by measuring the ‘difference’ between µ and its subsequent
verification. Suppose that µ is received from agent β at time u and is verified by ξ
as µ′ at some later time t. Denote the prior Pu(Xi) by p. Let p(µ) be the posterior
minimum relative entropy distribution subject to the constraints JXis (µ), and let p(µ′)
be that distribution subject to JXis (µ′). We now estimate what Ru(α,β, µ) should have
been in the light of knowing now, at time t, that µ should have been µ′.
The idea of Equation 3, is that Rt(α,β, µ) should be such that, on average across
Mt, q(µ) will predict p(µ′) — no matter whether or not µ was used to update the dis-
tribution for Xi, as determined by the condition in Equation 4 at time u. The observed
reliability for µ and distribution Xi, RtXi(α,β, µ)|µ′, on the basis of the verification of
µ with µ′, is the value of k that minimises the Kullback-Leibler distance:
RtXi(α,β, µ)|µ′ = argmink K(k · p(µ) + (1− k) · p ‖ p(µ′))
3.2 Social Model
The social model contains beliefs of the state of α’s relationships with other agents —
it consists of two components. First, an intimacy model that for each agent β consists
of α’s model of β’s private information, and, α’s model of the private information that
β has about α. Second, a balance model of the extent of reciprocity between pairs of
agents.
Intimacy and balance were first reported in [9] to support argumentative negotiation
where they were based on five illocutionary categories. Our requirements here are more
general, and the models are quite different but we retain the same names. The spirit
3 Entropy-based inference is a form of Bayesian inference that is convenient when the data is
sparse [13] and encapsulates common-sense reasoning.
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of them remains the same: intimacy — degree of closeness, and balance — degree
of fairness. Intimacy is defined in terms of information gain, and balance in terms of
ratings.
Private information is categorised first by the type of statement, using a set of illo-
cutionary particles F , and second by the contents of the statement, using the ontology
O. A categorising function κ : U → P(F), where U is the set of utterances, allocates
utterances to one or more category in the framework. The power set, P(F), is required
as some utterances belong to multiple categories.
Itα/β is α’s model of β’s private information; it is represented as real numeric values
over F × O. Suppose α receives utterance u from β and that category f ∈ κ(u) then:
Itα/β(f,c) = I
t−1
α/β(f,c)+λ× I(u)×Sim(u, c) for any c ∈ O, where Sim(·) is a semantic
similarity function [14], λ is the learning rate, Itα/β(f,c) is the intimacy value in the
(f, c) position in F ×O, I(u) is the Shannon information gain in Mt due to receiving
u using Equation 5, and Sim is as above. Additionally, the intimacy model decays in
time in any case by Itα/β = δ × It−1α/β where δ < 1 and very close to 1 is the decay rate.
Itα\β is α’s model of the private information that β has about α. Assuming that
confidential information is treated in confidence4 α will know what β knows about α.
This means that the same method can be used to model Itα\β as Itα/β with the exception
of estimating I(u) as it is most unlikely that α will know the precise state of β’s world
model — for this we resort to the assumption that β’s world model mirrors α’s and
‘estimate’ the information gain. Then the intimacy model is Itαβ = (Itα/β , Itα\β). In [9]
balance was defined as the element by element numeric difference of Itα/β and Itα\β .
That definition is not suitable here.
Rtα/β is a model of α’s aggregated rating of β’s actions in assisting α to achieve
her goals and satisfy her needs. α will have a variety of goals including the acquisition
of goods, information, offering and receiving advice, gossip, and so on. These goals
are categorised using a set of illocutionary particles G and the ontology O. Suppose α
triggers an action sequence s with goal g = (k, d) when the state of the environment is
e and on completion of the sequence rates the outcome as ρ(α, s, e) then:
Rtα/β(k,c) = R
t−1
α/β(k,c) + λ× ρ(α, s, e)× Sim(d, c)
for any c ∈ O, where ρ(α, s, e) is the fuzzy rating of the outcome of s as an integer
in the range [−5,+5], λ is the learning rate, Rtα/β(k,c) is the aggregated rating in the
(k, c) position in G×O, and Sim is as above. Additionally, the model decays in time in
any case by Rtα/β = δ × Rt−1α/β where δ < 1 and very close to 1 is the decay rate. This
form of decay means that in the limit all values in the model decay to 0 meaning “is
perfectly acceptable”. This may appear to be odd, but the model is used only to gauge
divergence from the norm; it is not used to select a trading partner — that is a job for
the trust model.
α should have “a pretty good idea” of how β ratesα’s actions in assisting β to achieve
her goals, and Rtα\β models α’s estimates of β’s rating of α’s performance. Then the
balance model is the pair Rtαβ = (Rtα/β , Rtα\β). This structure is a historical summary
4 See [10] for a discussion on measuring confidentiality i.e. ‘information leakage’.
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of how α believes it has “done the right thing”, or otherwise, by other agents. It also
exposes social debts, obligations and opportunities.
4 Expectations
An ecologically rational agent’s rationality lies only in its past experience. To behave
rationally it will require some expectation, based on that experience, of what other
agents will do. Experiential memory records each of the agent’s individual experiences;
it does not address expectation. We now derive expectations from this historic data.
Expectations are considered for the two classes of experience in experiential memory.
We consider expectations concerning the effect of triggering an action sequence.
Suppose that α triggers an action sequence, s with goal g where the state of the en-
vironment is e then we are interested in the rating of the outcome r. Given the rich
meaning of the environment, as described in Section 3, it is reasonable to consider:
P(Observet
′
(r) | Enactt(s), e) (6)
If Ω ∈ e is the set of agents in e, then the aggregated rating of their responsive actions
leading to the sequence outcome is a subjective measure of their collective trust, honour
or reliability — a fuller account of these estimates is given in [12].
We first consider a special case of the expected rating of a diminutive action sequence
consisting of a single agent, Ω = {β}, and a single action — as is observed in the
case of “commitment followed by subsequent enactment”. In this case if we estimate
Ptβ(v|u) where u is the commitment and v the enactment then:
Tα(β, u, e) =
∑
v
ρ(α, v, e)× Ptβ(v|u)
Then α’s estimate of the trust, honour or reliability of β with respect to a class of
utterances U will be:
Tα(β, U, e) =
∑
u∈U
Tα(β, u, e)× Ptα(u)
where Ptα(u) is as above.
For action sequences in general we abbreviate the expectation of Equation 6 to
Pt(r|s, e) that we may estimate directly using the same reasoning for estimating Ptβ(v|u)
because r is over a discrete space. Then Tα(Ω, s, e) = EtΩ(r|s, e) and Tα(Ω, S, e) =∑
s∈S Tα(Ω, s, e)× Ptα(s).
5 Ecological Deliberation
Human agents employ ecological deliberation for all but a very small proportion of
the decisions that they make [15]. The neurological processes that enable human non-
Cartesian deliberative processes are not well understood. It appears that given a need,
contextual triggers somehow retrieve appropriate action sequences from experiential
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memory. The retrieval process does not require a complete match and operates tenta-
tively when the perceived environment is new, possibly by adapting the action sequence.
This is reminiscent of the work of Roger Schank on dynamic memory.
When an agent is ‘born’ it will have no experiential memory, and its only rational
basis for deliberative action will be either through pre-programmed constructivist de-
liberation or by imitating a ‘parent’ or ‘teacher’. Thereafter, whenever it acts it will
observe the effects of its actions and its experiential memory will expand.
α has the following assets at its disposal to support ecological deliberation:
– an experiential memory — Section 3
– expectations — Section 4
– a world model — Section 3.1
– a social model — Section 3.2
Together experiential memory and expectations make a potent pair. Experiential mem-
ory contains details of action sequences, and expectations tell us what to expect if those
sequences are reused. The world and social models describe the states of affairs that α
desires to change.
An agent acts to satisfy its needs. An ecological agent’s rationality lies in the trust
that it has of others. This means that an ecological agent’s desires should address its
social needs as well as its material needs — these may not be compatible. And this
means that the actions that an ecological agent takes should attempt to shape its social
model as well as its world model5. An agent’s social structures, and the structures of
the institutions that it inhabits, are its means to transcend its individual ability.
Rather than give a tedious description of how each of the above operations may be
performed we simply assume that they all have been, and that we are confronted with
an enormous selection of previous, improved, adapted, simplified and created action
sequences.
Our problem then is: given a current need, the current norm state, and the current
states of the world and social models, to select one sequence. We deal with the com-
plexity of matching the current goal and environment to those of previously observed
sequences with a ‘super-Sim’ function that moderates the expected rating (Section 4) of
each previously recorded sequence, s, to give expectations of the rating, r(s) ∈ [0, 1],
of how that sequence would perform if it was reused now for the current need.
Given that we now face the problem of devising a method that selects an action
sequence it is worth considering first what we expect of that method. What it should not
do is to say “That one is the best choice” that is pure constructivism — it says “Carles
and John have greater knowledge than can ever emerge from the environment”. Worse
still it would mean that by determining the agent’s actions it would then pervert the
agent’s experiential memory for ever more6.
What is needed is an evolutionary method of some sort — that may well be how
humans operate. A problem with evolutionary methods is that we may not be prepared
to accept poor performance while the method evolves, although permitting a method to
explore and make mistakes may also enable it to discover.
5 In future work we propose to address how it should also attempt to shape the norms of the
institutions that it inhabits.
6 Unfortunately this complication also applies to the definition of ‘super-Sim’.
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The point of this digression is to excuse ourselves for presenting only a ‘quasi-
ecological’ method that permits the agent to explore whilst guiding it in an apparently
sensible direction. A strategy is reported in [16] on how to place all of one’s wealth as
win-bets indefinitely on successive horse races so as to maximise the rate of growth;
this is achieved by proportional gambling, i.e. by betting a proportion of one’s wealth
on each horse equal to the probability that that horse will win. This result is interest-
ing as the strategy is independent of the betting odds. The situation that we have is
not equivalent to the horse race, but it is tempting to consider the strategy that selects
sequence si with probability qi:
qi =
r(si)c∑
k r(sk)c
(7)
where c > 0 is a real constant that moderates the degree of exploration. This strategy
will favour those sequences whose expected performance and moderated by ‘super-
Sim’ is greater.
Finally we consider how an agent combines constructivist and ecological deliberation.
Ecological deliberation is by no means the poor relation of its Cartesian brother.
Referring back to the ‘wine merchant’ example in Section 1, it may simply be that the
recommendations of the wine merchant are better in all respects than those that the
agent could derive from the data available. If this is so then a rational agent should
surely prefer ecological deliberation.
A committed constructivist might respond by saying that clearly the agent should
learn as much about wine as the merchant and then everything becomes Cartesian again.
Creating a “Mr Know-It-All” agent is dangerous if it means that the agent believes his
knowledge will remain superior in a competitive world to that of other agents, he may
then live and decay in a state of sublime ignorance.
A rational agent builds an experiential memory and maintains an open mind on
whether to choose constructivist or ecological deliberation. It reinforces the choices
it makes by forming a view on which performs better by using its subjective ability to
evaluate outcomes.
6 Discussion
The full realisation of the Hayekian vision of self-evolving agents situated in a world of
self-evolving institutions is an extensive research agenda that is the subject of on-going
research. For example, there is no clear means of achieving an orderly self-evolution
of normative systems in a multi-system context. The contribution of this paper is to
describe how a single agent can engage in ecological deliberation in addition to well-
understood constructivist deliberation. This enables agents to evolve and adapt their
deliberative processes as their environment and their fellow agents evolve.
The social model contains beliefs of the strength of agents’ relationships, enables
agents to form desires of how those relationships could be, and to form intentions of
how to make them so. A possible next step is to experiment with a norm model in a
similar fashion. If this can be achieved through ecological deliberation then we will
be close to understanding self-evolving electronic institutions that will take multiagent
systems technology to a new level.
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